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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE. INTEREST
OF MARALEE LOND01N.
ROBERT GEARY LONDON and
SANDRA CLEGG LONDON,
Petitioners and Appellants.

vs.
BARBARA BELL. Guardian ad Litem
for JEANNE BELL,

Case
No. 10,002

Objector and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
An appeal from an order of the Juvenile Court of the
First District Court in and for Weber County, Utah

E. F. ZEIGLER, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
AND HOLDING OF TRIAL COURT
This is an appeal resulting from a judgment granted
in the Juvenile Court of the First District. The judgment
of the trial court was that the subject child be returned to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the natural mother. The Appel,lants, having been refused
a consent by the natural ~other, sou~ht to. h~rJe the child
declared deserted and abandoned, to complete their adoption proceedings. After the Court's ruling in favor of the
Respondent, the Appellants filed a motion to set aside
judgment for a re-hearing. The decision of the trial judge
'vas filed on July 30, 1963. The first notice of appeal was
filed by Appellants on August 27, 1963. The motion to set
Clside judgment was apparently filed on August 30, 1963.
rrhe order denying the motion for rehearing was filed on
September 24, 1963. The Appellants filed a second notice
of appeal on October 11,' 1963.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent desires that the decision of the lower
Court be affirmed and that this Court order that her minor
child be returned to her, in accordance with the decision
of the lower Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as stated by the Appellants are essentially
correct. There are additional facts, however, that the Respondent considers essential. The document referred to
under Appellants' Statement of Facts was prepared by the
Appellanrts and all statements made therein were prepared,
and the document was executed prior to the Appellants'
arrival in California to accept delivery of the child. (T. 9)
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Respondent further testified that she didn't want to give
her baby to Appellants but was coerced by her doctor and
relations to give the baby up. Respondent further believed
that she could recover possession of her baby in accordance with the wording of the document wherein the right
was reserved to her to refuse consent. (T. 7) Respondent
further only signed the document only after she was told
by the doctor, nurse and her mother, that she could not
see the baby until the papers were signed. (T. 8) Respondent further made an attempt and started to recover her
child approximately two months after it was delivered to
the Appellants. She also testified that within three weeks
to a month later that she decided to seek to recover her
child. (T. 14) No attempt was made by the Appellants to
obtain the consent of the natural mother, Respondent,
until approximately ten months after Appellants received
the child. Respondent had obtained counsel in Ogden to
bring an action to recover the child when Appellants filed
their petition with the Juvenile Court. (T. 22)

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
JEANNE BELL, NATURAL MOTHER, NEVER INTENDED HERSELF TO CONSENT TO THE PLACEMENT OF HER CHILD WITH APPELLANTS. HER
ACTIONS WOULD NOT SHOW AN ABkNDONMENT
OR DESERTION OF HER CHILD.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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From the testimoniY of Jeanne Bell, (T. 4), it is apparent that in her own mind Jeanne Bell wanted to keep
her child.
Q. And did you discuss, with them your desires

in this matter?
A. I told them I wanted to keep my baby.
Q. But she wouldn't allow it at the time. Is that
correct?

A. Yes, and especially when my doctor had told
me I might have to go to Court.
Q. At the time that these discussions were had,

did you advise anyone of your intent to place the
baby out for adoption?
A. You mean, did I tell anyone I would have
the baby adopted?
Q. Yes..

A. The doctor thought I should place the baby
with the Londons.
Q. Now was this before the birth of the baby?

A. Yes.
Q. Did you advise anyone besides your doctor?

A. We didn't talk about it at home. We were
planning to leave it up to the doctor.
Q. Were any provisions made for keeping the

baby at the time of its birth?
A. No.
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Q. None whatsoever?

A. My mother had made none, but I was planning on keeping it and fighting to get my baby
back when I could and as far as I knew I had no
legal way then of keeping it, so I planned some
day I would try and get it back if I could.
It is apparent from this testimony that the natural
mother never abandoned her child or intended to sever
her desire to regain possession of her child. In Taylor v.
Waddoups, 241 P. 2d 160, paragraph 6, our court defined
abandonment to be as follows:
"Abandonment, in such cases, ordinarily means
that the parent has placed the child on some doorstep or left it in some convenient place in the hope
that some one will find it and take charge of it, or
has abandoned it entirely to chance or to fate. To
make arrangements before hand with some proper
and competent person to have the care and custody
of the child is not an abandonment of it as that
term is ordinarily understood. True, the mere act
of giving away the child by the parent into the care
and custody of another may militate against him
in reclaiming its custody."
As also stated in Taylor v. Waddoups, the mere lapse
ot the time, without more, is not decisive. As stated in
paragraph 2 of the trial courts decision, Jeanne Bell did,
during the ten month period, exert efforts to investigate
her rights and attempt to contact her child and was concerned about the child's welfare. It is further apparent
from her testimony that during the ten months period she
had done things on her own to attempt to regain possession of her child. (T. 22):
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. No. I did not know I would be allowed to
until two weeks ago. I talked to the Legal Aid Society and I found out that according to California
law I had the right to have my child returned and
I didn't know what I could do. Then I got in touch
with Attorney Murray. I wanted to but I didn't
know I could.
Q. Didn't you say that you consulted some peopleat Welfare to find out what your rights were?

A. Yes, I found out that I should be able to
care for the baby if I had her.
Q. Did you con:sult an attorney in California,
Miss Bell?

A. I consulted Legal Aid at first.
Another case wherein the facts are similar to the case
at bar is In Re Guardianship of Rutherford, 10 Calif. R.
270, wherein it was held that the mother had not surrendered her rights to her child where she had given it up for
adoption only on the advice of other people and basically
against her own convictions. People v. Anonymous, 210
~.Y.S.

2d 698.

From the wording of the document that was signed
by the natural mother in the hospital, as stated in the next
to last sentence.
I HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED AND UNDER-

STAND THAT THIS STATEMENT IS PURELY
A STATEMENT OF MY PRESENT INTENTION
AND THAT I HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO
REFUSE TO SIGN MY CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION WHEN IT IS PRESENTED TO ME.
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Jeanne Bell reserved her right to recover her child, and
she relied upon said statement. It also appears from the
testimony of Jeanne Bell that she signed the document
because she was refused the right to see her child. (T. 8)
Q. Isn't it true that this exhibit No. 1 contains

a statement of your rights with respect to this.
A. I know my rights, but I didn't know some
things and there were things in there that I
couldn't exactly remember that I didn't find at the
time I signed it, things that I should have had the
right of discussing with my family and as I say,
some of the things I remember and then I re-read
the paper when I got home from the hospital but I
did read the paper there, but there were a few
rights I feel I should have been told.
Q. But these rights that you are talking about

were not rights that the Londons represented to you
in any that you did not have, did they?
A. I think I should have had a chance to hold
my baby and talk this over with my mother.
Q. Do you know whether or not the Londons
were responsible for your failure to be able to hold
your baby and talk these things over with your
mother?

A. No, I think it was the doctor and nurse. The
nurse told my mother that they had orders not to
let me see my baby until the papers were signed.
It is also apparent from the testimony that the document was prepared by Appellants and therefore should be
strictly construed against them.
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POINT II
THAT THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN OBTAINING THE CHILD IN CALIFORNIA AND BRINGING IT INTO UTAH WAS IN VIOLATION OF UTAH
STATUTES.
Utah Statute 55-8-3 provides as follows:
PLACEMENT OF CHLDREN FROM WITHOUT
STATE:
Every child brought into or sent into the State for
placement or adoption in the State shall be sent to
and placed by an agency licensed under the provisions of this Chapter.
It is apparent that the reason for this statute is torequire that all children brought into the State of Utah to be
placed for adoption, must be placed with a licensed agency
as provided by law. The legislature knew that investigation should be made concerning the home for the child,
the ability of the prospective parents to be able to adequately care for the children, and to have some control,
supervision and regulation of the placement of children
for adoption. It is obvious that this statute was intended
to stop the baby traffic, and bringing of children from
other states into the State of Utah without going through
the licensed agencies.
If the procedure followed in our case is legal, then the
Utah Statute would be circumvented and there would be
no regulation or control over children brought inrto the
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State of Utah and the protection and benefits of the statute
would be completely annulled.
The Utah Legislature has seen fit to place rigid restrictions and regulations concern~ing the adoption of children in the State of Utah. If this practice is legal, there
could be a substantial increase in children brought into the
state through no control or regulation. It would be a means
whereby any Utah couple, that did not desire or could not
comply with the Utah Law concerning the adoption of
children in Utah, could go to some other State and obtain
a child through whatever means and bring it into the State,
and accomplish what the legislature has sought to prohibit.
Utah Statute 55-8-5 further provides:
Every person, agency, firm, corporation, or association violating any of the provisions of this Chapter,
or who intentionally makes any false statement or
report to the State Department of Public Welfare
with reference to the matters contained herein is
guilty of misdemeanor.
It is very clear that the criminal penalty imposed by
Statute for the failure to comply with Statute 55-8-3, concerning children brought into the State, that the legislature
intended to put teeth into the law in requiring the children
be placed with agencies when brought into this State.
POINT III
THAT THE NATURAL MOTHER CANNOT VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISH HER RIGHTS TO HER
CHILD. UNLESS A CONSENT IS OBTAINED AS PROVIDED BY UTAH STATUTE.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah Statute 78-30-4 provides as follows:
That the parent or parents whose consent would
otherwise be required have theretofore, in' writing,
acknowledged before any officer authorized to take
acknowledgment, released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency licensed
to receive children for placement or adoption under
Chapter 8 Title 55 and such agency consents, in
writing, to such adoption.
It is clear from the expressed statement of this Statute
that the only means by which a consent can be taken from
a parent is if it is given to a licensed agency. 78-30-8 further provides:
The person adopting a child and the child adopted,
and the other persons whose consent is necesary,
must appear before the district court of the county
where the person adopting resides, and the necessary consent must thereupon be si~ed and an
agreement be executed by the person adopting to
the effect that the child shall be adopted and treated
in all respects as his own lawful child; provided,
that if a person whose consent is necessary is not
within the county the court may, in the same manner as is or may be provided for the taking of depositions in civil cases, appoint a commissioner to
examine such person upon his deposition and to
take his written consent and to certify the same to
the court. The commissioner shall explain to such
person the legal significance of such consent, and
shall certify to the court his finding as to whether
or not the consent is freely given. Where such person is within the state of Utah the commission shall
issue to a judge of the district court of the county
in which such person is located.
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As is stated in this statute, the law requires that any

consent given must be given before a commissioner appointed by the court. Until this is done and this consent is
freely given then there has not been a consent that would
permit an adoption to be granted.
It is interesting to note that the statute -says that the
commissioner shall certify to the court, his findings as to
whether or not the consent is freely given. It is apparent
that the reason for this statute is that there shall be some
formality to the signing of consents wherein people agree
to release their own children and that this is for the protection of the natural parent so that these will not be hurriedly or unwillingly given.
There is no reason why the consent of Miss Jeanne
Bell could not have been taken before a commissioner appointed by the court, prior to November of 1962. It would
be a reasonable inference that the adopting parents knew
or heard from Doctor Sloan that Miss Jeanne Bell had
indicated that she wanted her child returned and would
not sign the consent, and that the longer that the Londons
could keep the child in their home the stronger their case
\vould be in claiming permanent custody to the child.
As stated in Taylor v. Waddou,ps, 241 P. 2d 157, Utah
Statute 78-30-9 no longer sanctions the relinquishment of
a child for adoption before a notary public.
POINT IV
THAT, JEANNE BELL, WITH THE HELP OF HER
MOTHER CAN PROVIDE A SUITABLE HOME FOR
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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'rHE CHILD AND HAS THE FINANCIAL MEANS OF
CARING FOR THE CHILD.
(T. 48, 49)

Q. Do you own your own home?

A. Yes, I do.
Q. What is its approximate value?

A. I had it appraised about five years ago and
it was vppraised at $30,000, and since now the property has now gone up it would be between $32,000
and $35,000.
Q. How many rooms are there in the home?

A. It has eight rooms.
Q. And how large is it? How large is the lot?

A. We haven't had that
Q. Is there an apartment on this property too?

A. Yes, I have. It is built in a wing, as a lot
of people do on their homes in that area and some
people rent to a lady or a school teacher.
Q. Have you rented that before?

A. Oh, I rented it once when I was working.
I had a lady help with the kids for part of the rent
and baby sit with the girls.
Q. How much did it rent for?

A. At that time they rented for $75.00 a month.
She rented it for $50.00 and then I took the other
$25.00 for baby .sitting.
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Q. What is the monthly income you have now?

A. We have it set up by the Glendale Court as
our allowance, family allowance. They include a
Social Security and Veteran's pay that we get and
then they added $100 a month.
Q. What is your total monthly income?
A. I bring it up to at least $400 a month. Sometimes $450. If necessary I can work all of the time,
but I wanted to spend part of the time with the
girls.

Q. Do you have any money in savings now?

A. Yes, I do.
Q. How much is that?

A. $3,800 and I have my bank book here with
me. I can give you the bank account.
Q. This is $3,839.00 that is in your account. Is
that true?

A. Yes, that is right.
Q. And according to this Jeanne has in her ac-

count $1180.00 and Denise has $1221.00?
A. That is right.
Q. I noticed on the books that in the last year

these accounts have increased from about $2,500 to
$4,000. Have you been able to save this much
money in the last year?
A. Yes, I worked and some of that was stocks.
The sum of $2,500 were paid from them.
Q. Do you have any of that stock now?
.A..

~o,

they have been paid now.
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. Q. Do you have any other assets besides your
saVIngs accounts and your home?

A. No, I don't.
Q. Do you feel that you have sufficient funds

to provide for the necessities of this child?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Would you be willing to assume this obli-

gation?
A. Yes, I would. Definitely.
POINT V
THAT IT IS BETTER FOR THE WELFARE OF
THE CHILD THAT IT BE RAISED BY ITS NATURAL
PARENT.
The common law and our decisions have consistently
held that there is a strong presumption that it is in the best
interest of a child that it be left in the home of the natural
parent. In Re Bradley, 167 P. 2d 978. It is apparent from
the record that an investigation of the home of the natural
parent was made by the California Youth Authority and
that the report was favorable. There is nothing in the
record that would indicate that the natural mother is not
of good moral character and in fact from her testimony
it appears that she was of above average intelligence and
maturity. The court, upon its own motion and with the
consent of the parties, had the natural mother evaluated
by a psychologist. Testimony given by the psychologist
on page 102 indicates that she does have sufficient mental
capabilities. (T. 102)
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Q. Have you had occasion to talk with her?

A. Yes, I have.
Q. Was this pursuant to a request by the at-

torneys involved or by the Court?
A. By the Court.
Q. Was this in the form of an examination?

A. Yes sir, it was.
Q. Will you explain the nature of the tests that

were given?
A. The request was that I give a battery of
tests for a phychological examination. Do you want
me to tell what tests were used?
THE COURT: Yes.
DR. SWANNER: We used the WechslerBellevur (Form II), Bender-Gestalt, Memory
for Design, Drawing, Rorschach, TAT, M.M.
P.I.
A. Would you explain the procedure you used?
(Procedures were not clear on tapes)
Q. Now, is this the standard approach in de-

termining the level of security of the person?
CLERK: Dr. Swanner, please speak a little
louder.
(Dr. Swanner explained the purpose of each
test but did not speak loud enough for mechanical device to pick up.)
Q. W auld you like to go ahead and tell the
Court your opinion?
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A. Well, my impression at this point is that
she is as mature as a fifteen year old could be.
Q. Based on your tests, could you give an opin-

ion that would indicate whether or not she could
adequately raise a child of a little over a year old?
A. In my opinion, there was nothing to indicate
that she couldn't.
Q. And what do you base your opinion on?

A. She has above average intelligence, attends
scho?l. She seemed to have made reasonable plans
and Is able to relate. My impression of her is she
is quite mature.

POINT VI
THAT THE FINDIN·GS OF THE JUVENILE
COURT, SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THEY
ARE CL.EARLY AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.
It is apparent that the Juvenile Court took considerable time and gave this matter great consideration before
the decision was rendered. The Court itself prepared the
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Decree. Testimony and depositions were introduced from all available
'vitnesses and sources of information. The Court on its
own directed that an investigation of the home of the natural mother be made in California. The Court also, with
the consent of the party, ordered that the natural mother
be given the psychological and mental evaluation to de-
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termine her abilities to assume the responsibilities of
n1otherhood. The Court also stated on page 3 of the MemClrandum Decision, as follows:
Another consideration1 in determining custody is
the home in which the child will be living if returned to her mother. The child would live with its
mother in its grandmother's home in California.
An evaluation of that home made for the Court by
the California Youth Authority is favorable.
Finally, the Court would like to note its own observations of the mother taken from her conduct
in Court. She exhibited composure and maturity
unusual to a girl her age and her responses to
questions put by counsel and by the Court showed
an insight into the responsibilities and difficulties
of motherhood.
In light of this evidence the Court cannot conclude
that the presumption in favor of leaving the child
with the natural parents has been overcome. The
Court recognizes that it will be difficult for the
child to be acclimated to a new setting and environment. But it is also the Court's observation, as
well as that of many professional writers, that in
most instances adoptive homes present many problems to the children involved. The Court therefore
finds that it would be in the best interest of Maralee
London that she be returned to the custody of her
natural mother, under the courtesy supervision of
the California Youth Authorities.
Our Court has stated in the case of State in the Interest of K-B-, cited in 326 P. 2nd, 395, as follows:
Hearings in the Juvenile Court as to the custody
of children are equitable, and the Supreme Court
is responsible for reviewing the evidence; and the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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findings made will not be disturbed unless they are
clearly against the weight of evidence or the Court
has abused its discretion.
On page 3 of Appellants' brief, they mention that the
order of the Juvenile Court was that the natural child
should remain with Appellants pending the decision of the
Supreme Court. It is only reasonable and logical that this
arrangement should be ordered.
The child has been in the Appellants' home since
February, 1962 and a few more months would not alter
the situation to any degree. If the child had been removed
from the State of Utah our Court would lose jurisdiction
until the case was finally decided. As stated by the Courts,
there will be adjustments for all parties concerned. In the
opinion of the psychologists, Trial Judge and the California
investigation, it was believed that considering all factors
concerned that the child should be returned to its natural
mother.
POINT VII
THAT THE LETTER REFERRED TO ON PAGE
12 OF APPELLANTS' BRIEF, SIGNED BY JEANNE
BELL, WAS NEVER MAILED AND DID NOT EXPRESS
HER TRUE DESIRES.
Through a misunderstanding with her mother, Jeanne
Bell thought that her mother did not want to further assist her in attempting to regain her child. The letter was
never mailed and was taken against the will of Jeanne
Bell and delivered to Appellants. (T. 106-107)
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Q. Miss Bell, I will show you what has been

marked exhibit No.7 and ask if you can identify it,
please.
A. Yes, that's a letter I wrote to Mr. Murray.
Q. Now, was that letter written after the first
hearing in this court room?

A. Yes, it was.
Q. And was it written after the examination by

Dr. Swanner?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. You did, in fact, deliver it to Mr. Drennan to
be mailed?

A. Not to be mailed. Well, Tom was on his
way over and my mother was just leaving and he
knew I had had some trouble and had written it.
Q. Can you tell me how be obtained possession
of the letter?

A. Well, first of all it was one night after we
got back from Court here. I talked to him on the
phone one night and I was having it with my mother. I told him I had written the letter and he said
he would come over. My mother was just leaving
and because I had a misunderstanding with my
mother. I wrote the letter and then Tom said he
would come over to see me. Tom was on his way
over and she was just leaving when' he got there.
He said "give me the letter and I will mail it." He
took the letter and then he had to move his car so
she could get out. She was very upset with me and
she told Tom to leave and not come back until she
was home. And then he ran. My mother censures
our letters and I was going to leave it in a place
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where she could read it. I didn't seal it. We had
argued over our financial situation. I \Vrote this
letter to see if she would understand my feelings.
I really had no intention of mailing it. I think I
wrote more as a threat. Just trying to show her that
I would change my mind. I wrote the letter more
for her. Then after I wrote it thinking she would
realize how I felt. I wrote the letter. We were talking before she left and he said, "where is your letter and I will mail it," so my mother didn't read it.
When he came back, I asked him for the letter and
he said it was in the car and I thought he mailed it.
And I asked him where the letter was. He said that
it was right here in his pocket. I said, "give it back
to me" and he said, "I'm going to mail it tomorrow
morning" and I called Attorney Murray then and
asked him to disregard it.

POINT VIII
THAT APPELLANTS KNEW THAT THE NATURAL MOTHER COULD REFUSE TO CONSENT TO THE
ADOPTION, UNTIL A LEGAL CONSENT WAS OB'fAINED. (T. 98)
Q. And you knew that as you told it, Jeanne
could give you trouble until this was done?

A. Yes.
Q. By trouble you knew that she might have

the right not to have to give her consent?
A. I knew she had to sign a paper.
Q. You knew she had the right not to give it

if she didn't want to?
A. Yes.
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Q. And you knew that when the papers were

signed?
A. Yes.
Q. So when you took the baby in your pos-

session, you knew that she had legal right not to
consent to the adoption?
A. No. I knew that she had the legal right not
to sign the paper.
POINT IX
~

FROM THE TESTIMO·NY AND CONDUCT EXHIBITED BY THE NATURAL MOTHER IN OPEN COURT
IT WAS APPARENT THAT SHE WAS ABOVE AVERAGE INTELLIGENCE AND MATURITY FOR HER
AGE. (T. 31)

Q. Speaking of yourself, are you actually trying

to satisfy your own feelings, your own needs or
what you really feel is best for the child?
A. I think I am doing what is best for the child.
I am very concerned about what happens. to her
later on in life, her health and I want to be with
her, helping her.
Q. In your discussion, I get the distinct im-

pression that you think of the child as a baby?
A. I think of her as a child.
Q. You keep talking about her as a very young

child. Have you thought about her in terms of a
6 year old, a 7 year old, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18 year
old?
A. I've thought her as going to school.
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Q. Have you thought of her in those terms, or

are you thinking of something you can fondle
something you can hold.
'
A. Well, I feel that I might help her. I feel that
I can help her and guide her and see that she gets
religious training while she is growing. I would
be able to comfort her and I could help her and
guide her.
Q. What if she isn't interested in religion.

A. Well, I think that with the proper training,
she will do what is best and with guidance and help
she will learn what is right and wrong and have a
conscious to do right.
Q. You don't anticipate your daughter then

being injured or hurt by the fact that you and her
father were not married?
A. I thought about that and that was one reason for my going to church.
Q. Will it help your daughter?

A. Yes, it will. She will learn about the Bible
and God and to be good.
Q. The inquiry of the court as conducted has
been quite broad, however, I think that under the
allegations that the mother is not a proper person
that inquiry would be within the confines of our
discretion.
1

POINT X
THAT THE APPELLANTS DID NOT FILE A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND THEIR NOTICE OF
APPEAL WITHIN THE TIME PROVIDED BY LAW.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
Rule 59 of the U.R.C.P. provides that a motion for a
new trial must be made within ten days after the entry of
the judgment. The motion for the re-hearing or new trial
was not filed until August 30, 1963. The judgment was entered on July 24, 1963. The first notice of appeal was filed
on .August 27, 1963. A second notice of appeal was also
filed on October 10, 1963. It would appear that the Appelbnts have not perfected their appeal as provided by law .
.-lnderson v. Anderson 282 P. 2nd 845 In Re Lynch's Estate 254 P. 2nd 454. Further, the designation of record on
appeal. and cost bond, were not received by Respondent
until December 6, 1963, several days beyond the ten day
provision of Rule 74, U.R.C.P. Holton v. Holton, 243 P. 2nd
438.

CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate for all concerned that these situations
develop. If the Utah laws and statutes had been complied
\Vith this situation would probably never have come about.
If the formalities of obtaining a proper consent, as provided by Utah statutes, were initially followed, the Appellants would have known if they could effect a valid adoption. Also if the formalities regarding obtaining the consent
of the natural mother were followed, then in all probability the consent would not have been given and the mother
could have recovered the child shortly after its birth. If
the natural mother would have given her consent, as provided for by Utah statute, then she could not later on
revoke this consent.
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It is apparent from the evidence that the parties intended this to be a temporary arrangement and that an
adoption could not be effected until the natural mother
had given a valid consent. This is why the Appellants
initially had a commissioner in California. They did not
claim that the child was neglected, delinquent or dependent until after they learned that the natural mother would
not give her valid consent. It was then that this action
was filed in the Juvenile Court to circumvent the proceedings for obtaining the consent. To permit children to be
brought into our state, by this method, will foster and
encourage baby traffic, without control. There will be no
protection1 for the child and no investigation of the home
or circumstances of the adopted parents as our legislature
considered essential.
It is respectfully requested that the decision of the
Trial Judge be affirmed and that the custody of the natural
child be returned to her natural mother, as provided in
the Decree rendered herein.
Respectfully submitted,

KEITH E. MURRAY
Attorney for Respondent

No. 10 Bank of Utah Plaza
Ogden, Utah
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